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Why should the history of text be of interest to the history of science, and in particular, the history of mathematics?
According to a contemporary view, specific textual considerations, such as matters of style and other aspects related
to the cultural background of scientific documents are exclusively relevant to the mode of presentation of scientific
results. From this perspective, mathematical writings are especially privileged, for their mode of discourse is that of
symbolic expressions in which no explicit appeal is made to the author or the imagination of the reader. The “trans-
parency” of the medium simply lets the content (concepts, theories, laws) shine forth. This assumption goes along
with the idea that cultural and cognitive aspects, as well as the material realization of the text itself, are “immaterial”
to the results being conveyed. Philosophers of the past coined the expression “eternal truths” to take into account the
presumed absolute context-independence of mathematical results. The view encourages the scholarly practice of un-
critically transcribing earlier scientific writings into contemporary forms. Moreover, it is often taken for granted that
the transcription does more than just convey the original results, it helps to clarify the results by simply making them
more familiar for the contemporary eye to read. This is what historians call “anachronistic” reading of our sources.
In her introduction to this well documented collection of essays History of Science, History of Text, Karine Chemla
reminds us that even as regards mathematical texts, authors and readers of the past “developed attitudes towards, and
approaches of, their text that we must seek to recover, if we want to avoid practicing an anachronistic reading of
our sources” (p. xii). But while in the case of other subjects the effort to recover the author’s attitude towards the
practice of writing, even the material conditions for the composition of works may appear as compelling, why should
“anachronistic” reading be a capital sin in mathematics? The texts discussed in this volume aim to show that even in
the case of mathematics, an author’s mode of seeing her writings “can by no means be assumed to be, without further
inspection, for any time and any place, identical to those we spontaneously adopt” (p. xii). Especially in the case of
writings produced at times and cultural spaces which are remote from our present point of reference, such as texts
in ancient Chinese, Sanskrit mathematics, or ancient Greek mathematics, a careful historical anthropology of reading
constitutes an essential tool. The historian of mathematics relies on such tools to acquire information concerning how
authors and readers of the past made sense of the writings that are now our sources.
Chemla conceives of a domain of research, the history of text, that should be of great use to the history of science,
in particular the history of mathematics. A consideration of the variety of forms texts have taken throughout history
will help us to become aware of the difficulties related to making sense of our sources; moreover, it will shed light
on the particularity of different uses of writing. Finally, and most importantly, this ongoing research conceives of
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deeply intertwined with cognitive, social and local factors of production. The approach follows current trends in
the history of science that break with the assumption underlying the contemporary view that there is a sharp divide
between the content of scientific results and the appearance and constitution of scientific writing (which includes its
material realization with the relevant visual/tangible aspects).
The guiding idea of the volume, then, is that “the design of written inscriptions is a constitutive part of the scientific
work and an essential condition for research to be carried out” (p. viii). This guiding idea then connects with the
working hypothesis upon which the different case studies of the book are based: “texts, as such, are to be presumed
as historical objects in every respect” (p. viii). The fact that texts are produced at specific times within particular
cultural communities certainly constitutes them as possible objects of historical inquiry. But Chemla argues that texts
are “historical objects” in a more radical sense, that is, they are “historical objects in every respect” because scientists
produce their texts, shaping them as text, while carrying out their work; and in so doing they are shaping their results
(concepts, theories, ideas) as well as sharing them with others.
As already noted, this view opposes the idea of the “objectivity of content”: the assumption that once the results
have been obtained by other means (characteristically in an immaterial space of “thought”), they are merely transcribed
into textual structures that leave the results as it were wholly untouched. Contrariwise, the papers in the volume intend
to show that the texts produced in the course of the practice of science belong to the outcome of the scientific work.
Hence a consideration of such aspects would seem of relevance to understanding knowledge and the objects of science.
Given that our main access to knowledge remains the text (“text” in the broad sense of information displayed on the
page, either discursive texts or other forms of visual displays such as drawings, tables, etc.), the history of text thus
conceived is part of the history of science. We thus come to the specific focus of the book, the fact that texts are
working tools, mostly “paper tools”,1 with multiple functions the most conspicuous of which are: (a) to assist in
the solution of problems and the undertaking of research; and (b) to serve as tools for exchange and communication
between researchers.
Scientists depend on the technology available for organizing, producing and using their writings. Moreover, sci-
entists draw on resources which are part of the “textual culture” already available at their time; and even as they
create new textual resources (for instance, new forms of symbolic notation) those resources are often worked into the
texture of available textual culture, transforming them in various ways (reshaping them, limiting, or enlarging them).
In making these points, the book considers a wide variety of texts selected from a worldwide corpus ranging from
sources on oral and written texts of ancient Sanskrit mathematics and ancient and early modern Chinese texts, to early
modern European works. The volume divides into four main parts and closes with an Epilogue, “Knowledge and its
Artifacts”, by David Olson (pp. 231–246).
Part I of the volume entitled “What constitutes ‘a text’?” consists of one extended paper by Vera Dorofeeva-
Lichtmann (pp. 3–47). She addresses this question by focusing on the case of the “Spatial Organization of Ancient
Chinese Texts”. Since the invention of the printing press, texts are characteristically displayed on the page for the eye
to read from left to right. But what is the relevance of spatial layout of text for “reading” a text? Many mathematical
texts of the past have come down to us transcribed into the nowadays familiar form of linear discourse printed in
the pre-established format of (sequences of pages of) a book. The transformation from textual multi-dimensional
structures into linear sequences was supposed to be immaterial, and is often not even mentioned. The study of some
ancient Chinese writings suggests otherwise. According to Dorofeeva-Lichtmann, in the case of ancient Chinese
text the original diagrammatic structures have often been ignored even by sinologists. She explores a selection of
ancient Chinese writings that appear to have been composed as a set of textual (perhaps movable) units to be related in
complex, multi-dimensional ways like those found between the units of a diagram or chart. Under these assumptions, a
text serves two complementary functions: it may be seen both as an “elucidation” and as “graphic representation”, but
it “can only be fully comprehended through considering both of these facets simultaneously” (p. 4). The author focuses
on texts that were originally to be displayed in a structure emulating ancient Chinese models of space, characterized
by great regularity and orientation to the cardinal points; she bases some of her conclusions on archeological findings
(that go back to the past century) and the impact of the development of the writing media in ancient China, in particular,
1 I am borrowing the expression “paper tools” from Klein [2003].
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in the design of texts.
Part II of the volume, “The Constitution of Scientific Texts: From Draft to Opera Omnia”, consists of two pa-
pers that study the specific process of writing, at two very different historical moments. In the first paper, Eberhard
Knobloch’s “Leibniz and the use of manuscripts: text as process” (pp. 51–79), we learn about the shaping of math-
ematical work in progress, the stage of the draft. Knobloch examines Leibniz’s mathematical manuscripts, relying
upon what Chemla calls one of the most formidable “intellectual workshops” for the “production of knowledge in
written form” available to historians of science (p. xiii). The Leibniz Nachlass does much more than just illustrate in
great detail the process of writing (“text production”) as constitutive of the mathematician’s work in progress; Leibniz
himself was writing about writing and insisted upon the centrality of tangible forms of written signs for the expression
of thought and the growth of knowledge. Knobloch considers four different aspects under which the process of writing
goes along with Leibniz’s mathematical practice. I will return to this case study below.
The second paper of Part II, by Michael Cahn “Opera Omnia: The production of cultural authority” (pp. 81–94),
deals with the case of the completion of work as collected in the form of Opera Omnia. And this part of the volume
then closes with a discussion of Cahn’s paper by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (pp. 95–103). Overall the aim of Part II is to
focus on different stages in the conception, design and production of scientific writings. As the editor of the volume
points out (pp. xiii–xv) the cognitive processes at play in the progressive composition of manuscripts is especially
conspicuous, while in the case of the design of collected works, other types of factors (social and economic) and other
actors (the persona of the editor instead of the author) often come into play more substantially.
Part III of the volume entitled “How Scientific and Technical Texts Adhere to Local Cultures” includes three papers.
The first paper, “Text, Representation, and Technique in Ancient China” (pp. 107–21) by Craig Clunas, discusses the
role of books, “number”, and mathematics among the elite of China in the Ming period (1368–1644). The second
paper, entitled “The Algebraic Art of Discourse Algebraic Dispositio, Invention and Imitation in Sixteenth-Century
France” by Giovanna Cifoletti (pp. 123–135), establishes Peletier at the origin of the French algebraic tradition.
Finally, a paper by Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat, entitled “Ancient Sanskrit Mathematics: An Oral Tradition and Written
Literature” (pp. 137–57), analyses a technique of memorization of the earliest exposition of geometrical principles in
the context of Vedic rites.
Part IV of the volume, “Reading Texts”, contains three papers discussing some difficulties in recovering scientific
texts of the past. The first, by Reviel Netz, is devoted to “The Limits of Texts in Greek Mathematics” (pp. 161–76)
and scrutinizes ancient Greek texts. The second paper, “Reading Strasbourg 368: A Thrice-Told Tale” (pp. 177–200)
by Jim Ritter, examines a Babylonian clay tablet of the 2nd millennium B.C.E. containing a problem with its solution,
and considers several possible readings for the algorithm by placing the text in the context of other texts in each case.
Finally, the third paper, by Karine Chemla, entitled “What is the Content of this Book?” (pp. 201–30) emphasizes the
importance of developing methodological tools for recovering scientific texts of the past by discussing a method of
analysis that deals with two radically different types of texts: a Chinese text of the 13th century and a set of mémoires
and papers by Euler published in the mid-18th century and the 1820s. In particular, Chemla considers several non-
discursive modes of expression that may come into play in the composition of a text.
In what follows I shall briefly focus on the paper by Reviel Netz. I will then return to Eberhard Knobloch’s paper
on Leibniz, which will lead us finally into the themes of the Epilogue by David Olson.
Netz aims to uncover structural properties of some ancient Greek writings, specifically Apollonius’s Conics,
Book I, and Euclid’s Elements, Book XIII. A central concern is the issue of the relationship between written text
and figures: is the written text self-contained so that the diagrams are dispensable? The method of inquiry is to ap-
proach the text by asking about what Netz calls “the fixation of reference” or “specification” of letters, how letters
are related to their objects. Netz shows that the written (discursive) text is so intimately related to the figure that the
process of reading itself relies on the completed drawing; he suggests that the way a proof is written shows that the
proof was previously “carried out” (in non-written form) and the drawing underlying it completed, before the discur-
sive text was written down. But then, of what exactly does a proof consist? The written proof appears to be essential
to the presentation of the proof which depends on the completed figure; however, the written text is not recoverable
from the figure, nor the figure from the text. In other words, text and diagram “cannot be taken apart, none makes
sense in the absence of the other” (p. 172). More importantly, not all text is written text. According to Netz verbal
texts play a surprising role in ancient Greek mathematics, where by “verbal text” he means those parts of relevant
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proofs.
Against the backdrop of the importance of visual and oral elements in Greek culture, Netz then introduces the
idea of “limits of texts” in Greek mathematics. He argues that both written and verbal texts had limits in Greek
mathematics: the written text had limits because of the great importance of verbal aspects, while the verbal text had
limits measured up against the visual and the central importance of diagrams. Netz concludes that the foundation
on which all forms of visual and verbal interdependence are built, that is, the relevant specifications, are to a great
extent “pragmatic”, and “almost certainly diagrammatic”. He notes that less than half the letters employed in an
ancient Greek demonstration are fully specified, “as if the authors were indifferent to the question whether a letter
was specified or not, full specification being a matter of random result” (p. 171). Netz claims that this is exactly the
case: given that the text assumes the diagram, the specification of letters is indifferent. Hence moments of explicit
specification, the purpose of which is to fix the systematic use of “letters” as we find in Descartes’ Géométrie (1637)
or later writings, are nowhere to be found in Greek mathematics. But neither does the diagram allow us to infer the
(text of the) theorem; in particular, it does not specify all the geometrical objects on its own.
Finally, we note the almost complete absence of explicit cross-references in Greek mathematics as a consequence
of the emphasis on verbal aspects: in the selected writings, Apollonius uses Euclid’s Elements 195 times; Euclid’s
Book XIII uses other books of the Elements 126 times. When the writing uses a previously established result, this
is not made explicit. A contemporary reader would not have noticed this, but a look at Heiberg’s bilingual edition
of Euclid’s Elements [Heiberg, 1883] shows that the editor inserted the references in square brackets in his Latin
translation facing the original Greek (Figure 8, on p. 172).
According to modern standards of deductive rigor, in a proof everything essential to deductive inference has to
be made explicit [Frege, 1879, iii–iv]; however, a proof is often grounded in step-by-step deductions that rely upon
propositions already proved. Deductively structured mathematical knowledge, in particular, often relies on knowledge
of previous results which need to be acknowledged. Netz claims that, with some exceptions, “the sum total of the
results required by Greek mathematicians for their proofs is roughly contained in Euclid’s Elements” (p. 174). Though
we do not have any information about the relevant aspects of their geometrical practice, it is assumed that Greek
geometers would have “internalized” such set of results once and for all, and then used these visual and spoken tools
in their work. Thus, Netz concludes that ancient Greek mathematicians referred most of the time tacitly, “through
verbal echoes”, instead of relying upon any (written) textual guide. Although the dissemination of Greek mathematics
would have been indeed unthinkable without writing, Greek geometers nonetheless relied substantially upon visual
and verbal resources.
I now turn to the paper by Knobloch, which as already indicated is devoted to Leibniz’s use of manuscripts, and in
particular, the many different ways in which Leibniz carried out his mathematical research step by step, thus obtaining
his results by “thinking while writing” (p. 78). Perhaps it is this paper that best illustrates the guiding idea and the
specific focus of the whole book: we learn to what extent Leibniz’s mathematical thinking is deeply intertwined with
writing and, in particular, with the genesis of his mathematical texts. (The expression “text” is here used in a broad
sense so as to include conventional one-dimensional discursive structures, mostly in Latin but also in French, as well
as formulae, tables, figures, drawings, and different forms of illustrations.) For Leibniz, mathematical thinking unfolds
in and goes along with writing and because it does, “Leibniz’s posthumous writings provide a unique insight into his
intellectual workshop” (p. 51). Almost 50,000 handwritten, meticulously collected items bear witness to enormous
amounts of work in progress revealing not only Leibniz’s hitherto unknown scientific results, as well as some of his
shortcomings, but also the many different paths he actually followed to obtain his results.
For the historian of science, it should be clear that a painstaking, meticulous register of “thinking in writing”,
like the one kept by Leibniz, reveals much more than polished presentations of scientific results. What makes this
collection of drafts a fascinating case study to pursue is precisely the fact that by learning to read Leibniz’s manuscripts
one can trace the growth of knowledge in its many facets: suggestions, interrupted lines of thought, reconsiderations
of previous attempts, copious experiments with notations and different forms of drawings, philosophical reflections
about writing, retractions of faux pas, detection and correction of errors in some cases, overseeing mistakes in others,
rewriting of previous formulations, canceling out and/or adding portions of text, and so on. In other words, to be
willing to learn to read Leibniz’s drafts goes along with a determination to step into his intellectual workshop where
“the production of knowledge in written form” takes place.
246 Essay Review / Historia Mathematica 35 (2008) 242–247Knobloch’s paper on Leibniz’s use of manuscripts begins with a very fitting reflection by Leibniz himself concern-
ing the limited grasp his readers might have had of his work on the basis of the very few publications he had to show:
“Those who know me on the basis of my publications don’t know me” (p. 51).2 In spite of his reluctance to publish,
writing played a most crucial role in Leibniz’s mathematical thinking. In order to make this point, Knobloch proceeds
to describe Leibniz’s mathematical practice by selecting four aspects under which “texts” are being used by Leibniz.
“Texts” in Leibniz’s manuscripts: (i) serve the art of invention, (ii) enable the visualization of thoughts, theorems, and
proofs, (iii) fix insights and elaborate treatises, and (iv) transcribe discussion and argumentation. That is, Knobloch’s
work on Leibniz’s manuscripts surveys the extant “inscriptions” of the Leibniz Archives in Hanover, not simply to
consider the genesis of a text; instead the emphasis is on the design, shaping, and revision of texts as this process goes
along with Leibniz’s mathematical practice. And, as already noted, this case study is of particular interest because
Leibniz himself insisted upon the centrality of tangible forms of signs for the growth of knowledge. More importantly,
Leibniz conceived of a science of signs which would embody the norms for different forms of writing. As Chemla
points out, Leibniz’s reflections on, and writings about, writing turn this case into one of the richest to consider in
the history of mathematics (p. xiv). Knobloch’s contribution does not address the inter-connection between Leibniz’s
theory of signs and his actual practice in writing science, a fact that reminds us of the many open questions to be
pursued in contemporary Leibniz scholarship in the face of the great wealth of material still awaiting further research.
We need, in particular, to clarify Leibniz’s reading practice during his formative years in Paris (1672–1676) if we
are to understand how the knowledge imparted by his readings, in the context of the early modern intersection of the
intellectual or scholarly and the practical education, manifested itself in his innovative writing practice as well as his
philosophical vision of that practice.
Mathematical understanding begins with seeing; and the modern view that understanding and the advancement of
learning more generally require perceptible signs or forms of written expression can be traced to Leibniz. We owe
to Leibniz the insight that our forms of expression do not merely record our thought but are also an embodiment of
understanding. In his concluding paper “Knowledge and its Artifacts”, Olson sketches an outline of the fundamental
shift in the conception and uses of texts in early modern European literate culture, a shift we need to assume for
this insight to be conceivable. In early modern Europe the notion of what it means to be a writer/reader was being
transformed; and this transformation can be seen as a reflection of a new attitude towards signs, one that had been in
the making since the 12th century, beginning with Western commentators on the Old Testament, and would eventually
lead to the invention of a new mode of discourse. This new attitude towards signs produced not only a new way of
seeing/reading a text but also a new way of conceiving or designing a text, where (again) “text” can mean a variety
of different forms of representations on paper (or panels): drawings, maps, tables, diagrams, and engravings, as well
as both standard one-dimensional forms of writing (from left to right), producing rational discourse and Descartes’
symbolism for arithmetical relations.
One may say that in the modern understanding of text, reading a text just as writing (text production) appears as an
art which requires education and much technical training. In particular, learning to read this new form of text, as any
other art, requires a trained eye, and the practice of this art may differ depending upon the actors and factors involved
in the process of reading and text production. This new attitude to signs also produced new works: early modern
knowledge of nature, early modern science, even works of art. And in the wake of this transformation, the scholarly
reader became an “observer” of nature, a reader of “the book of nature”. The model for this mode of discourse is
modern mathematical writing in which no explicit appeal is made either to the author or to the imagination of the
reader. What the writer of such writing aims to present is simply something that is the case; the task is to reveal to the
reader what is there to be “seen” with the “knowing” eye, an eye that is highly educated and often aided by specifically
designed instruments. This is what Olson calls “autonomous text” (p. 235), characterized by the conspicuous absence
of any form of context-dependence; no reference to the author of the text or the reader’s psychological make up and
spatial or temporal circumstances is assumed to be essential for reading/understanding the text. We thus come full
circle, for it is just this idea of an “autonomous text” that underlies the contemporary view this collection of essays is
eager to call into question.
This book reminds us that even as regards mathematical texts, there is a less conspicuous, more subtle context-
dependence that our contemporary eye is trained to overlook when reading our sources, and sets out to enrich our
2 The reader does not find any reference here, as to the exact source of this comment by Leibniz.
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given our scholarly perspective today. Containing highly interesting documentation most relevant to the case stud-
ies under consideration, it represents an invaluable source of information for the historian and the philosopher of
mathematics.
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